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ars, and lawyers in an effort to shed light on a question crucial for all
these disciplines: what is the correct account of individual human rationality? In this Introduction, we will sketch the contribution the articles collected here make to the ongoing debate on this topic and explain the implications of that debate for the law.
The traditional economic account treats rational agents as seeking
to maximize their preferences. The preference-maximization model
has long been the dominant approach not only in economics, but also
in related fields such as psychology, decision theory, philosophical rational choice, and law and economics. The economic model understands the notion of preference in terms of an agent's ranking of her
choices and of the various possible outcomes of those choices. In the
simplest case, where the agent knows for certain which outcome will
result from each choice, she is enjoined to choose the option leading
to the highest-ranked outcome. From a philosophical perspective, the
above criterion may seem to leave the notion of "preference" an
empty one, since it provides no way to assess the rationality of an
agent's choices with respect to some underlying state of satisfaction,
and so no way to assess independently whether an agent's choices
maximize her preferences. The traditional model does not restrict
the content of an agent's preferences. There is nothing irrational, for
example, about choosing to spend the day picking blades of grass instead of making money or writing articles.
But the traditional account does place certain formal constraints
on the notion of a preference, and these help to make the preferencemaximization criterion more robust. In particular, preferences must
conform to the following three criteria: (1) completeness-an agent
must be able to rank any two items with which she is presented, unless
she is indifferent between the two; (2) transitivity--if an agent would
prefer an apple to an orange, and an orange to a banana, then it must
be the case that she would prefer an apple over a banana; and (3) reflexivity-an agent must be indifferent between an item and an identical item. An agent whose choices do not conform to these conditions
would be thought irrational, and her preferences could not be coherently maximized.
What if an agent is choosing under circumstances of incomplete
knowledge? How can an agent's choices conform to the above criteria
if she does not know, for example, what the results of her choices will
be? The traditional model assumes that even if the agent does not
know with certainty the outcomes of her choices, she can evaluate the
options open to her if she at least knows what the chances are of end-
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ing up with one result or another. The model also assumes that the
agent's preferences can be measured numerically in terms of utility.
The model then stipulates that the utility of a given choice is equal to
the utility to the agent of one of the possible outcomes from that
choice, discounted by the probability of its occurrence, plus the utility
of the next possible outcome from that choice, discounted by its
probability of occurrence, and so on for all possible outcomes of a
given choice. The best choice for a rational agent, then, is the choice
that maximizes her preferences or "utility," adjusting for the probabilities of which she is aware of obtaining specific outcomes.
What intellectual function is performed by the traditional economic account of rationality, and more generally by any model of rational choice? In his article for the symposium issue, Lewis Kornhauser carefully addresses this question, showing how models of rational
choice are employed to describe, explain, and evaluate choices, and to
facilitate.the design of institutions.' Much work in experimental psychology, economics, and recently in law addresses the first of these
two issues. The crucial question is to what extent the traditional
model accurately describes and predicts individual choices. So-called
behavioral economists say that the answer is, "Not very well."
Some of the articles make important contributions to this debate
about the descriptive and predictive accuracy of the preferencemaximization model. Jason Johnston considers various ways in which
the behavior of human beings seems to be contradictory. For example, people routinely spend large amounts of money to protect themselves against risks due to carcinogens and toxins, at the same time
that they engage in risky behavior like overeating or skydiving. But
Johnston argues that this behavior is actually consistent with the traditional model, and is not necessarily the result of irrationally placing
too much. weight on low-probability events.
Similarly, Michael
Wachter suggests that the failure of market prices to reflect the true
value of a corporation might reflect not the irrational enthusiasm or
pessimism of investors, but rather information asymmetries between
managers and investors concerning the amount and variability of the
future cash flows generated by corporate projects.

Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Domain of Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717 (2003).
Scott Johnston, Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Rational Actor Approach to the
Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 747
2Jason

(2003).

Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When FinancialMarkets Are (Only) Relatively
Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 787 (2003).
3
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A different ongoing debate concerns the success of the preference-maximization model as a normative account of choice. Symposium contributors focus on three different ways in which the traditional model might be questioned. First, a number of articles discuss
the impact of the passage of time on an agent's choices. George Ainslie
and John Monterosso agree with the traditional model that agents are
rational to discount future goods.4 But Ainslie and Monterosso also
argue that a commonly observed form of discounting, known as "hyperbolic" discounting, in which the value of a good is inversely proportional to delay, amounts to a kind of irrationality. Hyperbolic discounting, according to Ainslie and Monterosso, "lead [s] to changes of
relative valuation among goods at different delays as time passes." 5 An
agent, for example, may prefer not binging tomorrow to feeling
bloated the next day, even though tomorrow he will prefer to binge.
Note that hyperbolic discounting is consistent with the traditional
model. The agent at each time has a complete ranking of outcomes
which his choice at that time maximizes. Although this ranking varies
intertemporally, the discounting formula that produces it does not.
Indeed, as Leo Katz shows, the phenomenon of intertemporal variability in preferences over outcomes is paralleled by similar phenomena
in the moral domain, namely intertemporal variability in judgments of
harm and of wrongfulness." Our ex ante and ex postjudgments of the
harmfulness of an action might well diverge. One example Katz gives
is of an assassin who has just fired a bullet at his target but who has
missed.7 Imagine he is about to fire a second bullet. Before he fires,
one might consider the wickedness of this second attempt on his victim's life. At that point, we would have to conclude that it is every bit
as bad as the first attempt. Yet once the assassin actually fires, assuming he misses once again, it seems unlikely that what he has done in
firing two bullets, and missing, is appreciably worse than firing one.
Joe Mintoff challenges the traditional model by arguing that actions that fail to maximize an agent's preferences or utility may be rational as long as they are selected in the context of a prior intention or

4 George Ainslie & John Monterosso, Will as Intertemporal
Bargaining: Implications
for Rationality, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 825 (2003).
Id. at 830.
6 Leo Katz, Before and After: TemporalAnomalies in Legal Doctrine, 151 U.
PA. L. REV.
863 (2003).
7 Id. at
863.
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plan." He says that a rational agent may adopt plans that call for a suboptimal action when comparing the cost of complying with the plan to
the net benefit the plan provides. If the net benefit exceeds the cost,
the plan is rational for him to adopt. Mintoff then argues that the intention an agent forms acts as a filter on the agent's future deliberations. So despite the fact that an individual might fare better by performing an action that is inconsistent with his intention to perform
the suboptimal action, it is rational for the agent to stick to his intention when that intention is an essential part of an optimal plan.
A second way in which the traditional model arguably provides a
normatively flawed account of choice concerns risk. The traditional
model allows that an agent can be risk averse or risk loving with respect to the components of outcomes, for example, the agent's wealth.
An agent might prefer the certainty of one hundred dollars over a ten
percent chance of one thousand dollars. But this model insists that
agents are necessarily risk neutral with respect to utility itself. Ned
McClennen criticizes this feature of the traditional model, suggesting
specifically that agents rationally seek to avoid losses with respect to
"primary goods"-goods such as bodily integrity, mental and emotional integrity, and all-purpose resources such as money.9 McClennen seems to suggest that agents might particularly dislike taking risks
with primary goods, even when the amounts of those goods are calibrated in utility terms, and not merely when calibrated in some nonutility index.
Claire Finkelstein makes a related point in her article, arguing
that being at risk can itself be a kind of harm."' Intuitively, for example, subjecting someone to a substantial risk of physical harm seems
itself to be a welfare setback-or, to put the point in preference terms,
an intrinsically dispreferable feature of outcomes. Thus an agent who
is exposed to a risk of harm, but who suffers no actual harm would be
in a worse position than another individual who also suffered no
harm, but who was not exposed to risk. Similarly, she argues that a
person who is exposed to a chance of benefit receives a benefit because of the exposure, even if she does not in the end gain the actual
benefit for which she had hoped. Both claims appear to violate the
assumptions of the traditional model, because the model assumes that
8 Joe Mintoff, Can UtilitarianismJustify Legal Rights with Moral Force?, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 887 (2003).
9 Edward F. McClennen, Prudence and Constitutional
Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 917
(2003).
10 Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Hatn?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963
(2003).
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an agent's preferences are entirely a function of the actual outcomes
she can expect.
Cass Sunstein also engages the subject of risk in his article on the
precautionary principle." Sunstein does not commit himself to thfe
traditional model, but he does provide strong arguments against the
precautionary principle, which he takes to be a competitor to the traditional model. The precautionary principle is widely espoused by environmentalists and has been endorsed by the United Nations and
many foreign governments, particularly in Europe.
In its stiong
form, it says something like the following: "'When an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary
measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships
are not fully established scientifically. ' ' 13 Sunstein argues'that this is
incoherent, since precautionary measures will themselves, quite typically, create risks of health or environmental harms.
A final controversial aspect of the traditional model, taken as a
normative account, concerns the permissible content of agenis' preferences. Peter H. Huang, Eric Posner, Jonathan Baron, and Bruce
Chapman all, in different ways, address this aspect of the traditional
model. Huang demonstrates how the traditional model of preferences can incorporate agents' feeling such emotions as guilt or
pride-and'4 not merely be about preferences over their wealth or consumption. Huang demonstrates that (fiduciary) law is able to create
a socially desirable equilibrium by influencing individual investors'
expectations about how broker-dealers will behave, and those investors' expectations in turn influence the psychological payoffs to broker-dealers. This is a more nuanced, and hence more credible, account of why fiduciary law matters than accounts that explain fiduciary
law in terms of the preferences or constraints of broker-dealers. Posner makes the reciprocal point: the traditional model permits agents
to have "greedy" preferences, preferences that are wholly focused on
the agent's wealth or consumption and ignore all other (intuitively)
preferable features of outcomes, such as emotions, relationships, fair
itCass Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
12 For a survey of the development and application of the precautionary principle,
see THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAw:

THE CHALLENGE OF

IMPLEMENTATION (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds., 1996).
'. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1006
(quoting Lessons fi'om Wingspread, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT:

IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY

PRINCIPLE app. A at 353-54 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999)).
14 Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation,
151 U. PA. L. REv. 1059
(2003).
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dealing, accomplishment, and so on. " Posner shows how judges
sometimes take greedy preferences to be problematic, even irrational,
but does not himself endorse the irrationality claim-in part given the
difficulty of distinguishing between appropriately "moderate" and inappropriately "greedy" preferences for dollars and goods.
Baron observes that the traditional model allows persons to have
what he calls "moralistic" goals (or preferences): "goals for the behavior of others that are independent of the others' goals.' 16 Moralistic
preferences are, if not irrational, then morally unappealing, for we
would all generally be better off if no one had them.
Finally, Bruce Chapman points to a way in which the traditional
model may be too stringent with respect to the substantive content of
an agent's preferences. 7 Consider the case of an agent who, when offered a large apple and a large orange, chooses the large apple. But
when offered the choice among both these fruits plus a smaller apple,
he chooses the large orange, for the reason that it would be a breach
of etiquette to choose the bigger of two items in the presence of the
smaller. This choice behavior violates the so-called Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preference (WARP), which is often seen as an implication of
the traditional model: "if an agent ever chooses an alternative x over
alternative y from some set of alternatives, then that agent should
never (on pain of inconsistency) choose alternative y over alternative x
from any other set of available alternatives.".
In effect, WARP precludes the context of choice from counting as a preferable or dispreferable aspect of the outcomes resulting from choice. Chapman argues, however, that there are instances in which it is rational for
context to matter to an individual decision maker.
So much for the possible deficiencies of the traditional model as a
model of rationality. Why does any of this matter for the law? Clearly
the success or failure of a particular explanation of human behavior
has legal implications: which decisions people can be expected to
make is surely of great importance to judges, legislators, and administrators alike. But why does the success or failure of a given normative
account of rationality have relevance for the law? For example, why
would it matter to policymakers whether ideally rational agents would

15 Eric A. Posner, TheJurisprudenceof Greed, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1097
(2003).
Jonathan Baron, Value Analysis of Political Behavior-Self-Interested : Moralistic
Altruistic: Moral 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1135 (2003).
17 Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and CategoricalReason,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1169

(2003).
18

Id. at 1175.
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adopt Mintoffian plan-rationality or McClennenesque prudence? The
symposium authors address this important question in a variety of
ways. The following are some of the more specific suggestions on this
topic.
First, the state might have reason to discourage citizens from making irrational choices and encourage them to make rational ones.
This would, arguably, make sense if the action that promoted a person's welfare were also the action it was rational for him to select.
Colin Camerer, Sam Issacharoff, George Lowenstein, Ted
O'Donoghue, and Matthew Rabin, in their joint contribution to the
issue, delineate a variety of legal mechanisms, short of outright proscription, by which the state might seek to discourage irrational behavior.9 These mechanisms are "asymmetrically paternalistic," in that
they create relatively large benefits for those who would otherwise behave irrationally, but impose relatively small costs for rational actors
whose behavior does not need to be improved. Camerer and his coauthors are therefore optimistic about the usefulness of law in encouraging citizen rationality. Their optimism is not shared by Ainslie
and Monterosso, who express skepticism about law's ability to combat
the intertemporal irrationality created by hyperbolic discounting, '
nor by Posner, who is skeptical about the efficacy of judicial disapproval of greed in changing greedy preferences.2
Second, the fact that a legal institution would have been agreed
upon by citizens selecting their institutions in an antecedent position
of choice might serve tojustify that institution. Rationality, on a "contractarian approach," becomes a standard by which to evaluate legal
institutions. Social contract views such as that of Rawls" famously appeal to hypothetical rational approval under appropriate conditions as
an evaluative criterion for political and social arrangements. McClennen follows this tradition when he suggests that the rationality of
avoiding substantial losses to "primary goods"justifies legal protection
for those goods in the form of constitutional welfare rights.13 On the
other hand, Matthew Adler argues against the view that rational approvability provides a reason to favor any legal institution to which it
applies. Imagine that a governmental official is making a choice that
19 Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the

Case/or "Asymmetric Paternalism,"151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
Ainslie & Monterosso, supra note 4, at 862.
21 Posner, supra note 15, at
1129.
22 See generallyJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJusTrCE (1971).
23

McClennen, supra note 9, at 944-46.
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will affect law or legal institutions in some way. Imagine, too, that one
of the official's options is rationally approvable by each and every citizen. Specifically, this option maximizes each citizen's preferences,
given each citizen's probability information at the time of the choice.
Does this fact provide the official a moral reason to choose the option? Adler argues that it does not; his argument casts doubt upon the
moral importance of "ex ante efficiency" and more generally seeks to
undermine any approach that evaluates possible laws, legal doctrines,
institutional structures, and so forth by asking which option citizens
would rationally choose. 24
Third, normative accounts of choice can be directly applied to legal actors. One might criticize particular types of governmental
choices as irrational and praise others as rational. For example, if the
traditional model provides the correct account of rationality, then legal officials who deviate from the model and instead follow the precautionary principle would be behaving irrationally. This would
amount to a telling criticism of that principle. Sunstein not only
demonstrates the flaws of the precautionary principle as a normative
account of choice, but quite directly and understandably infers from
that premise the conclusion that policymakers ought not follow it.
Finally, the articles in this issue may help to shed light on the conflicts that arise between the economic criterion of welfare maximization and the traditional noneconomic content of many legal rules,
such as rules that create rights. The reason is that enforcing or honoring a legal right will often turn out to conflict with the demands of
welfare maximization. In such a case, how can state officials or citizens have moral reason to enforce or honor the right? Recall Mintoffs answer: certain state commitments or plans to recognize legal
rights function as "filters" constraining future official or citizen
choices, just as certain rational individual plans render rationally ineligible some future choices on the part of that individual. 25 But can
the nontraditional accounts of rationality do any better at integrating
rights into a rational actor approach to legal rules? Or does incorporating legal rules that articulate rights force us to abandon the rational
actor model altogether? Though the articles in this issue do not, individually or collectively, contain answers to deeper jurisprudential difficulties of this sort, our hope is that they will prepare the ground for a
broader discussion on such topics.
24

Matthew D. Adler, The Puzzle of "Ex Ante Efficiency ": Does Rational Approvability

Have Moral Weight?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1255 (2003).
25 Mintoff, supra note
8, at 908.
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